Ethics Commentary Part I: Morality and Cultural Relativism

This is a note I wrote on Facebook over a year ago. It's about the book I had to read for my Ethics class. I planned on making it a three-parter, but I only wrote two of them before I got...well, tired of it. I guess the problem was that the main reason for them was addressed in the first two sections of the book, and I didn't have the motivation to continue. So, for this blog, I will post those two notes (and perhaps make some small changes to them), and then finally go back and finish the third part. EDIT: I will change the way these are sectioned off, since these notes are pretty big. There will be two chapters per post. I hope you enjoy reading them, and that they entertain, inform, and/or inspire you.

To start, here's part one:

In my Ethics class, we read The Elements of Moral Philosophy, by James Rachels (the sixth edition by Stuart Rachels). The focus of the class was on learning about the inner workings of some of the more basic and/or prevalent philosophies out there. I was suspicious of such a class at first, remembering the massive amount of nothing I learned in Morality class in high school, but as the class began to pick up speed, I really enjoyed it. Until we got to the chapter on Subjectivism and Emotivism.

It shouldn't have taken me this long to start having a problem with the text, seeing as it treated Cultural Relativism in a similar manner, but...the main problem I had with the book was that the author wasn't objective enough. Sure, no one's ever entirely objective, but I felt like he was making flimsy arguments. And in our two exams in the class, he specifically told us not to write about how we felt, and I found myself pointing out in my writing--a lot more than was necessary--that it was Rachels who thought there were problems with the theories, and not me.

So I couldn't resist writing just what I thought about these things. I will go through the 13 chapters of the book, and respond to Rachels. This will be a seven-part post, with two chapters per post and one whole post for the last chapter. Here, I will start with the first two chapters.

Chapter 1: What Is Morality?

 This chapter brings up three cases, and shows different reactions to them. Baby Theresa, a child born only with a hind brain, destined to die very soon, could have her organs removed to save other children. Jodie and Mary, conjoined twins, have one fatal problem: Mary leeches off of Jodie to the extent that they can't both live; either Mary must be killed to save Jodie, or they both die. And Tracy Latimer, a child with cerebral palsy killed by her father out of pity for the painful condition she was in.

He then uses the rest of the chapter to talk about impartiality, and how "The morally right thing to do is always the thing best supported by the arguments." While that sounds nice, it doesn't really work all the time. After all, perhaps the arguments on both sides are horrible. Or the thing which turns out to be right has the worst arguments going for it. Take Divine Command Theory, for instance. If God's decrees made things right, then the arguments one could make about the action itself wouldn't matter at all.

But I do like the idea that we should be reasonable about morality, instead of allowing our feelings to dictate our actions. We must be discretionary agents, and I agree with Rachels there. Personally, my answers to the three cases are as follows:

1. Take Baby Theresa's organs. She's not really experiencing anything, so you shouldn't have any qualms about hurting her anyway. And if you don't, you're just letting other kids die with her. So why not?

2. Kill Mary. If you don't, they're both gonna die. Would you rather have one child or none?

3. He didn't do anything wrong. Tracy had a miserable life (the book goes into detail about the immense amount of pain, and her life was gonna suck. It's basically a case of euthanasia in which she didn't have the capacity to ask for it). I wouldn't do this myself, though, since I don't want to go to jail like he did.

Are all of these answers reasonable? Sure. By my logic, they make perfect sense. One of the problems with linking morality to reason is that the conclusions reached through reason are subjective. I'll approach this concept many times again.

Chapter 2: The Challenge of Cultural Relativism

Cultural Relativism is a philosophy that pretty much says, "When in Rome, do as the Romans do." Morality, in this context, exists in those things which your specific culture deems correct. Rachels explains the argument in this fashion:

"1) Different cultures have different moral codes.

2) Therefore, there is no 'objective' truth in morality. Right and wrong are only matters of opinion, and opinions vary from culture to culture."

Rachels makes a good point about the failure of this argument. Simply, just because people disagree about morality doesn't mean that objective truth in morality doesn't exist. All it means is that people disagree. The problem I have with Rachels, however, comes when he explains other problems with the theory. Of course, this is something he falls into a lot when he points out "problems."

1. "We could no longer say that the customs of other societies are morally inferior to our own." Yes, Rachels, congratulations, you figured out what Cultural Relativism is. This objection basically states the whole point of the theory, saying that it's a problem. He talks about the slaughter of protesters in Tiananmen Square, obviously trying to use pathos to show that we should look down on such practices, therefore the theory must be wrong. Something which he does incessantly. Yes, Rachels, your morality would say we must condemn the Chinese government for such an action. But Cultural Relativism says we can't. That's how the theory works, okay?

2. "We could no longer criticize the code of our own society." Again, major duh. He does slightly improve by pointing out that this would bar us from changing our society, but of course by CR's standards, that wouldn't matter.

3. "The idea of moral progress is called into doubt." No, really? The idea of "progress" itself, in my opinion, is unfounded Realist talk. As I have said many times before, "progress" is merely an idea without substance. Things don't progress, they change. So ending that change doesn't necessarily mean anything bad is gonna happen. So we stop "progressing." CR wouldn't see any problem with that, so it's not a problem with the theory. (In my Environmental Lit class, we specifically challenged the ideal of "progress," pointing out its detrimental affect on social structures and the planet as a whole.)

I do like, however, the next section of the chapter, which brings up a valid point: a lot of cultures have the same core values, if not the same moral code. Talking about a culture in which cows are sacred because our ancestors could be reborn into them, Rachels explains it this way: "We agree that we shouldn't eat Grandma; we disagree about whether the cow could be Grandma." He even gives the example of the Eskimos, who kill infants, especially girls, in order to maintain the balance in their society. Which brings me to what I like about Cultural Relativism: the fact that it is, to some extent, a discretionary discipline. While our society doesn't need to kill infants, the Eskimos do. Thus, it is a practical moral code for them, and we shouldn't judge them poorly for doing what we wouldn't--and don't need to--do.

And another thing: Rachels brings up Fauziya Kassindja, a 17-year-old from Togo that came to America hoping to escape a cultural practice of her people--excision (or female genital mutilation). Rachels uses this to point out how much we might think condemning other cultures makes sense. But I use it, instead, to say that we should be allowed to leave a culture that we don't like. Cultural Relativism might say that we can't condemn a culture, but that doesn't mean we have to remain in it. I suppose you could say that some cultures might see it as morally right to stay within your culture, but...so what? Be wrong, then. I envision CR bringing about a world where people can pick and choose which country they live in to suit their own moral interests. This would be complicated, but at least it makes sense of this example.

Rachels never mentions this, but my teacher, Tim Hansel, actually gave a problem with CR that I think is valid: what, really, defines a "culture"? Obviously there are countries, but what about groups within a country? Families, groups of friends, institutions, communes, etc. I think about it as an analogy to the way law works--on both federal and state levels. But with morality, it's a lot more complicated. If my country says one thing is wrong, but my family holds it to be right, which takes precedence? Of course, this argument is a little muddy (you could just say that all these inner cultures should conform to the main culture, or you could say that country-cultures just don't exist, then), but it could be a defining area for Cultural Relativists.